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While considering the current  legal frameworks adopted by the regional and 
international anti-corruption conventions this article aims to show (1)  that the lack of a 
unified approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful 
way, (2) that regulation is unlikely to be efficient results unless there are robust 
enforcement mechanisms in place, and (3) that anti-corruption legislation provides only 
a partial answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialization. 
Part 2 (How Widespread is Corruption?) critically assesses the methodology adopted by 
Transparency International (TI) for compiling its perception index. Part 3 (Regulatory 
Measures: The Conventions) examines the current frameworks adopted by the existing 
conventions to tackle corruption. Part 4 (Enforcement and Informers) highlights the 
difficulties associated in enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated 
qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing enforcement deficit. Part 5 
(Fighting Corruption Through Re-Socialization) asks whether greater social awareness 
through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of 
society the view is   put forward that  part of the answer for effectively tackling 
corruption lies in making people aware of its long-term effects. 
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21. Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s world attention1 has been drawn to the problem of corruption and 
much has been said and written about the links between corruption and poverty.2 As a 
result regional and international institutions have been hyperactive in drafting and 
adopting legislation to combat corruption. We now have eight regional and international 
conventions. Not all are in force. 3 While it would be logical to expect that these 
conventions have adopted a harmonized approach to combating corruption, the scope of 
these legal instruments vary and conventions drafted more recently have taken an 
increasing robustness in their comprehensiveness by creating offences that may be 
arguably questioned for their disregard of due process.4
This article examines the current legal frameworks adopted by the conventions, 
regional and international, with the aim of showing (1)  that the lack of a unified 
approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful way, (2) 
that regulation is unlikely to be efficient results unless there are robust enforcement 
 
1 Civil society organisations, Transparency International (TI) amongst them, have done much to draw 
world-wide attention to this menace. Since the mid 1990s, TI  has been publicising the incidence of 
corruption in countries through its now well established, and widely known and cited  corruption index. 
The list of countries in their index has increased steadily and includes countries, developed and developing. 
These statistics are published by TI on an annual basis. The corruption indices from 1995 onwards are 
available on their website http://www.transparency.org
2 See Alatas, S Corruption, Its Nature, Causes and Functions (1990) Aldershot: Brookfield, Bergstein & 
Elliott K (eds) Corruption in the World Economy 1997 Washington: Institute for International Economics; 
Mbaku ‘Africa after More than Thirty Years of Independence: Still Poor and Deprived” 1994 (11) Journal 
of Third World Studies 13, Askin, S & Collins, C ‘External Collusion with Kleptocracy: Can Zaire 
Recapture its Stolen Wealth?’ 1993 (53) Review of African Political Economy,  Gould D & Mukendi 
‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa:  Causes, Consequences and Remedies’  1989 (12) International Journal 
of Public Administration 427; Guhan S & Paul S (eds) Corruption in India: An Agenda for Action (1997) 
New Delhi: Vision Books;  Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor Cmnd 
5006 (2000) London: HMSO; Rose-Ackermann S ‘The Economics of Corruption’ (1975) 4 Journal of 
Public Economics 187; Dudley ‘The Rotten Mango: The Effect of Corruption on International 
Development Project’ available at http://www.user.gwdg.de , Lambsdorff ‘How Corruption affects Public 
Welfare’ (2001) Discussion Paper 9, Center for Globalisation and Europeanisation, University of 
Goettingen. Gray, C W & Kaufmann, D ‘Corruption and Development’ in 1998 (35) Finance and 
Development 7, Tanzi, V ‘Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’ 1998 
(45) IMF Staff Papers 559Corruption may also have something positive to contribute. For instance, in a 
highly bureaucratic state corruption may speed up the mechanism for economic development. On the 
positive aspects of corruption see Heidenheimer, Johnston M & Le Vine V (Eds) Political Corruption: A 
Handbook (1989) London: Transaction Publishers.  
3 See ‘Regulatory Measures’ below. 
4 See Carr I ‘Corruption in Africa – Is the African Union Convention on Combating Corruption the 
Answer?’ forthcoming Journal of Business Law.
3mechanisms in place, and (3) that anti-corruption legislation provides only a partial 
answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialization. Part 2 
(How Widespread is Corruption?) critically assesses the methodology adopted by 
Transparency International (TI) for compiling its perception index. Part 3 (Regulatory 
Measures: The Conventions) examines the current frameworks adopted by the existing 
conventions to tackle corruption. Part 4 (Enforcement and Informers) highlights the 
difficulties associated in enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated 
qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing enforcement deficit. Part 5 
(Fighting Corruption Through Re-Socialization) asks whether greater social awareness 
through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of 
society I  put forward the view that  part of the answer in tackling corruption lies in 
making people aware of its long-term effects. 
Before proceeding with the task at hand I wish to dispel some commonly held 
beliefs in respect of corruption. It must not be surmised from the close relationship 
between corruption and poverty that it is exclusively a developing country problem. It 
occurs in developed countries,5 the recent scandal in Britain surrounding the Labour 
Party peerages for loans6 being one possible such illustration. Recently, the TI has also 
published a bribery index which shows that many of the commercial interests from 
developed countries are engaged in bribing public officials in developing countries.7
These cases of bribery occur in the context of public procurement contracts, licensing and 
foreign direct investment8 thus reinforcing the opinion of policymakers and think tanks 
 
5 Doig, A Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (1984) Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
6 See The Independent May 17, 2006, The Daily Telegraph July 16, 2006. 
7 There is also evidence of this from the various prosecutions in countries such as  the US that companies 
through their employees or agents  engage in the bribing of foreign public officials. See e.g. SEC v Triton 
Energy Corp Fed Sec l Rep (CCH) P 74, 405 (DDC Feb 27, 1997); ICC Case no 6401 (199.1991) 
Westinghouse and Burns & Roe (USA) v National Power Company and the Republic of the Philippines;  
see also Scherer, M ‘Circumstantial Evidence in Corruption Cases Before Arbitral Tribunals’ 2002 (5:2) 
International Arbitration Law Review 29;  Kimberly A E (ed) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997) 
Washington DC, The Institute for International Economics; Wei S J How Taxing is Corruption on 
International Investors NBER Working Paper 6030 (1997) National Bureau of Economic Research; Wei  S 
J Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance or Major Obstacle? Policy 
Research Working Paper 2048 (1999) Washington DC: The World Bank. 
8 See Hartman, M ‘Government by Thieves: Revealing the Monsters behind the Kleptocratic Masks’ 1997 
(24) Syracuse Journal of International law and Commerce 157; Jun D J ‘Bribery among the Korean Elite: 
Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor’ 1996 (29) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1071; Lajcakova, J ‘Violation of Human Rights through State Tolerance of Street-Level Bribery: Case 
Study: Slovakia’ 2003 (9) Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 111; Ferreiro, A ‘Corruption, Transparency 
4from developing countries  that  developed countries are equally to blame for their 
contribution to grand corruption in their countries.9 Evidence also indicates that affluent 
developed countries are equally prone to corruption at the petty level as the recent 
scandal surrounding possible corruption amongst prison personnel10 suggests. 
Neither is corruption a by-product of ruthless capitalism, which promotes self-
interest and maximum economic growth as opposed to the interests of the community.  
While it is true that in a  competitive global market, where countries such as China and 
India offer lucrative returns as a result of cheap labour and lax environmental and labour 
standards, bribes play a role in getting a foothold, it is by no means a product of 
capitalism. Corruption was found equally in the bureaucracies of non-capitalist countries 
such as the USSR.11 It seems to be a universal disease found in all societies regardless of 
the political, social, religious and economic background.  
In addressing corruption, the importance of the motivations and reasons for 
corrupt behaviour cannot be overstated. An understanding of the underlying reasons will 
help towards the creation and adoption of a suitable remedial strategy that might require a 
conscious, energetic and persistent effort in imparting information at the ground level 
about the detrimental effects of corruption thus empowering citizens to adopt suitable 
measures to curb corruption.  A noticeable aspect of   many of the studies on corruption is 
that they fail to take into account human nature which has as much to contribute to 
corruption as socio-economic conditions.  
 
2. How Widespread is Corruption? 
 
and Political Financing: Some Reflections on the Experience in Chile’ 2004 (10) Southwestern Journal of 
Law and Trade in the Americas 345. 
9 The belief that the private sector is also to be blamed for corruption is also acknowledged by the Center 
for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the US Chamber of Commerce. According to them 
“NGOs and civil society organisations alone can’t reduce corruption – business participation is the key to 
success. The stakes for the business sector are high – if businesses chose to remain on the sidelines and 
continue to participate in corruption they face missing opportunities for foreign investment.” Center for 
International Private Enterprise Economic Reform Issue Paper No 0409 September 22, 2004. Available at 
http://www.cipe.org .
10 See ‘Main Jail Staff Corrupt – Report’ July  31, 2006 available http://news.bbc.co.uk.
11 See Simis, K USSR:  The Corrupt Society (1982) New York: Simon Schuster. Russia continues to be a 
highly corrupt society and President Putin has  launched a high profile anti-corruption drive which has seen 
the removal of a number of high level officials in departments such as customs, internal affairs ministry and 
federal security services. See 2006 (58:20) The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 1.  
5Anecdotal evidence from businessmen and tales of morally questionable behaviour on the 
part of public servants  by visitors to and from third world countries normally go a long 
way in forming the impression that corruption is a highly visible phenomenon in many of 
the developing and least developed countries. Indeed in some countries it is said to be 
systemic and so embedded culturally that to try to root out corruption is seen as an 
impossible task.  To conclude from such anecdotal evidence that corruption is common 
place in developing countries is methodologically suspect since it lacks objectivity. A 
better alternative may be  to examine a country’s crime statistics, number of complaints 
and prosecutions12 for corruption and corruption related offences. This method also has 
its flaws. It is reliant on a number of assumptions. Among these: 
 
• that there is a culture of complaint/disclosure of fraud,  
• that there is legislation criminalising various forms of corrupt behaviour such as 
bribes and trading in influence,  
• that corruption and corruption related offences are listed separately13 and not 
subsumed under other offences such as fraud, embezzlement or extortion, 
• that there is an effective investigation and prosecutorial system that is trusted by 
the citizens, 
• that there is easy access to justice, 
• that the country maintains an efficient database of complaints, prosecutions and 
convictions, and  
• that the statistics are reliable and  publicly available. 
Unfortunately, many countries do not have corruption specific legislation though this 
is changing due to the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and other regional institutions such as 
the African Union (AU) and the South African Development Community (SADC). 
 
12 According to Lambsdorff “the number of prosecutions reflects only the quality of the prosecutors”. (The 
Methodology of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index available at  http://www.transparency.org ) 
‘Quality’ is a value laden term and it is unclear whether for instance it refers to the truth seeking aspects 
and thoroughness of the prosecutors or whether it refers to a willingness to prosecute readily any allegation 
of corruption.  I do however agree that prosecution of itself is insufficient to gauge the actual levels of 
corruption in a country since many cases of corruption may not reach the prosecution stage. 
13 The Indian National Crime Records Bureau  records cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act 
separately. Figures available at http://www.ncrb.nic.in . 
6Equally crime statistics are gathered (sometimes sporadically)14 by home affairs 
directorates and police commissions but these are not made publicly available thus 
making it difficult to assess the true extent of the problem. In some countries under- 
reporting is acute due to lack of trust in the police.  This is true of many of the 
developing countries.15 
Even if a jurisdiction meets the criteria listed above prosecution figures may only 
convey  part of the story since many instances of corrupt behaviour may not be 
prosecuted due to lack of evidence or may go unreported for a  number of reasons such 
as: 
• fear of reprisals from the recipient of the bribe, 
• apathy, 
• ignorance of legal rights, 
• lack of access to justice, 
• lack of trust in the police, 
• lack of transparency in the judicial system, and 
• fear of involvement in a long drawn out process. 
Facts and figures while imparting objectivity at present provides only a partial 
picture and it would be illogical to conclude from these that corruption is an endemic 
problem globally. This inevitably raises some interesting questions in respect of the TI 
index on which we have come to place so much reliance. Among the questions are those 
in respect of methodology and reliability.  
Based on perceptions, the TI draws upon a number of sources, private, non-
governmental organisations and international institutions. Their selection is guided by 
various criteria that seems to seek some level of uniformity of methodology amongst the 
sources selected. Whether the sources provide a ranking of countries, and whether they 
measure the overall extent of corruption without mixing it with issues such as political 
instability are some of the criteria that influence the choice of sources.16 For the 2005 
 
14 For instance, Lesotho, Namibia and Malawi. 
15 See Strategic Programme Framework on Crime and Drugs for Southern Africa (2003) Vienna: United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Crime and Development in Africa (2005) Vienna:  United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. 
16 See Lambsdorff  The Methodology of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. The  TI Steering 
Committee influences the choices. 
7index the TI drew data from surveys produced by  the Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN),17 the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 18 
Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH),19 Information International (II),20 International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD), 21 Merchant International Group (MIG), 
22 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, (PERC), 23 United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), 24 the World Economic Forum (WEF), 25 and the 
World Markets Research Centre (WMRC). 26 It must however be pointed out that the 
level of uniformity achieved through the selection criteria is  not influenced by aspects of 
the data gathering process. There are noticeable variations between the sources in terms 
of those surveyed, the number of countries covered and the questions asked. Taking the 
constituency used for the purposes of conducting the surveys, the IMD relies on 
businesspeople, UNECA on a local expert panel, PERC on expatriate business executives 
while  CIESIN relies on  US-resident country experts drawn from policy analysts,  
academics and journalists. The number of countries covered as well as the number of 
responses vary from source to source. For instance, CIESIN covered 95 countries and 
received 224 replies, IMD 51 countries with roughly 4,000 replies while WEF  covered 
117 countries and received 10,993 replies from a constituency consisting of senior 
business leaders of  domestic and international companies.  As to the nature of the 
questions broached in the survey there is wide variation again.  While the subject matter 
under consideration is corruption in broad terms the questions vary in terms of 
specificity. For instance,  the II focuses on  the economic costs of corrupt behaviour 
including the issue of nepotism in the context of public contracts,  IMD  on bribery and 
corruption in the economy, and FH27 on the extent of corruption as practiced in 
 
17 http://www.ciesin.org . 
18 http://www.eiu.com . 
19 http://www.freedomhouse.org . 
20 http://www.information-international.com . 
21 http://www.imd.ch . 





27 The country reports (Nations in Transit) are in essay format where the authors provide a broad analysis 
of the country of their expertise. However FH provides a checklist of questions on seven categories which 
includes corruption. They also  provide guidelines for ratings. 
8governments as perceived by the public and as reported in the media, laws on financial 
disclosure and conflict of interest  as well as the implementation of anticorruption 
initiatives.  While the TI has made every effort to ensure some sort of parity in 
methodology by taking into account the use of a ranking system and subject focus in the 
selection criteria of the sources used for the corruption index there is wild deviation 
between the sources in terms of detail. Survey questions vary, some focusing solely on 
corruption in the public sector. They utilise people from different backgrounds to arrive 
at their data, some rely on the business sector while others on country experts. Regardless 
of the concerns about lack of a uniform approach in data collection what TI has 
highlighted is that corruption is  perceived as a global problem, be it in a business or in a 
wider context. While the TI does not provide us with a knowledge of true reality it 
nevertheless  provides a shadowy representation sufficiently convincing to influence a 
multitude of international and regional institutions to draft corruption specific instruments 
with the result that the fight against corruption has been internationalised. The growth in 
the number of international initiatives is an indicator of the high profile given to 
corruption by policymakers and politicians. Regardless of the impact of TI on  national 
and international law-making there is still the pressing issue of whether the methodology 
of arriving at corruption levels could be made more robust in providing knowledge of the 
true extent of the problem. What has to be realised is that corruption is a secretive activity 
and as such we are reliant on reflections . All that we can do is to sharpen these 
reflections. This may be achievable by increasing the survey sample and ensuring greater 
homogeneity in the constituency  and harmonisation of the survey questions.  
 
3. Regulatory Measures: The Conventions 
 
9Regulation,28 using a variegated mix of cautions, fines, loss of freedom, and incentives, is 
a popular choice amongst policy makers and politicians as a means of  achieving the 
desired goal. It exploits the psychological aspects of human beings. Fear of loss of 
freedom and  social stigma attached to criminal records,  for instance are all seen as 
sufficiently effective to deter29 undesirable behaviour and mould  the social condition of 
mankind to a preconceived standard.  Given the human propensity towards a degree of 
unpredictability and an inclination towards rule ignoring, sanctions play an important role 
in guiding human choice. Their negative impact on a person’s identity and status  both in 
the short and long term may ‘persuade’ the person to reconsider their motivations  and 
desires. Sanctions, however, do not serve the moulding of human behaviour as well one 
would expect as made apparent by  crime statistics. In these circumstances we have to ask 
whether there are alternatives to regulation that might work better, an issue that will be 
explored in Part 5 below.  
To tackle  the global problem of corruption international institutions and regional 
groupings look to criminal law as a means of regulating human behaviour. Since 1996, 
eight conventions have been adopted for combating corruption.  Of these, seven  30 see 
criminal law  as the vehicle for combating corruption. Given the number of international 
and regional institutions involved in drafting corruption combating legislative 
frameworks for adoption by Contracting States it would be reasonable to expect that there 
has been mutual co-operation between the various regional bodies and international 
institutions resulting in a largely harmonised and a comparatively  uniform legislative 
approach to fighting corruption amongst the Contracting States. Unfortunately the  
 
28 Use of regulation as a means of solving various social problems has been on the increase world wide. 
Whenever there is a perceived social problem the answer for  legislators seems to lie in  legislation.  The 
UK is no stranger to this approach. (See Hall S Drifting into a Law and Order Society 1980 London: 
Cobden Trust Williams P & Dickensen J ‘Fear of Crime’ 1993 British Journal of Criminology 33.) The 
recent introduction of Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) in the UK to tackle socially disruptive 
behaviour of largely teenagers and young adults is one such illustration. There is always the danger that 
such regulation may be used as part of a public relations exercise by the government of the day to indicate 
to the public that it is taking its paternalistic role seriously. With a twist of cynicism it may also be seen as 
intricately linked to electoral results. 
29 According to Vogelson J M it seems that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has deterred the corrupt 
practices of US firms. See ‘Report of the ABA Committee on Corrupt Practices to the ABA’ 1996 (30) 
International Lawyer 194.
30 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999 deals with civil actions for those who 
have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption. It came into force on I November 2003 and has 
received 27 ratifications or accessions.  See Carr, I ‘Civil Law and Corruption’ (forthcoming). 
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conventions vary in terms of both substantive and procedural provisions, and 
comprehensiveness. Lack of conformity between the conventions means that the 
Contracting States are likely to tackle the issue of corruption in different ways thus 
leaving the door wide open to uncertainties,   extradition in the context of transnational 
corruption being one of these.   
It is not the intention here to examine the provisions of  each convention in great 
detail. The aim here is to amplify the differences and points of departure by focusing on 
specific topics: corruption and corruption-related offences; preventive measures;  mutual 
assistance and international co-operation with the intention of  highlighting the lack of 
coherence in the  current international legal frameworks. The   conventions that are 
considered for this purpose are chronologically: 
 
i) Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption 1996 (hereinafter “OAS Convention);31 
ii) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention  on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions 1997 (hereinafter “OECD Convention”)32 
iii) Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the Fight Against Corruption involving Officials of the 
European Union Communities or Officials of Member States of the European 
Union 1999 (hereinafter “EU Convention”)33 
31 Came into force on 6 March 1997 and the following countries have ratified or acceded to it: Argentina, 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas (Commonwealth), Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & 
Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
32 Came into force on 15 February 1999 and has received ratifications or accessions from Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. 
33 Still in the process of receiving ratifications. See also Council Framework Decision 2003.568/JHA of 22 
July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (OJ L 192 of 31.07.2003). According to Art 249 of 
the EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam a decision is binding in its entirety upon those to 
whom it is addressed.  
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iv) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 (hereinafter 
“COE Convention)34 
v) Southern African Development Protocol Against Corruption 2001 
(Hereinafter “SADC Protocol”)35 
vi) African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003 
(hereinafter “AU Convention);36 
vii) United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 (hereinafter “UN 
Convention”);37 
viii) Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal law Convention on 
Corruption 2003 (hereinafter “COE Protocol”)38 
A. Corruption – The Scope 
 
The starting place for any convention is its scope.  It would be normal to expect the 
conventions to  define the word ‘corruption’. Admittedly corruption is a fairly complex 
concept due to its multi-dimensional character and  the word is used in a variety of senses 
from moral degradation to the economic benefit obtained by an individual in a position of 
 
34 Came into force on 1 July 2002 and has received ratifications from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
35 Not yet in force. So far the following have ratified : Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
36 Came into force on 5 August 2006. It has been ratified by  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, 
Congo Libya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Niger,  Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. 
37 Came into force on 14 December 2005. So far the following ratifications or accessions have taken place: 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
Congo, Croatia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sao tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, and Yemen. 
38 Came into force on 1 February 2005 and ratifications were received from Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenis, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and United Kingdom. 
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power by virtue of that individual’s role within an organisation. 39 In practice, the 
conventions, other than the SADC Protocol,40 refrain from providing a general definition 
of corruption but focus on specific types of corrupt behaviour. It is however possible on 
the basis of the offences created by these conventions to group  them into two conceptual 
frameworks. I call these ‘Framework A’ and ‘Framework B’ for convenience sake. 
Corruption, as stated earlier, can occur in different contexts but much of the corruption 
reported is in the context of public sector, be it at the petty or at the grand level. It is not 
uncommon to hear many anecdotes of petty  corruption from those living in developing 
countries. The classic form of corruption, bribe,  is a regular phenomenon in seeking the 
provision of basic services such as an electric or telephone connection from government 
owned utilities. At the grand level corruption veers its ugly head in a variety of situations 
ranging from public procurement contracts, the obtaining of licences and permits, foreign 
direct investment, construction contracts, through to tax incentives and arms  deals. 
Framework A targets corruption in the public sector and addresses the issue of 
abuse/misuse of power by those in public office for private gain.41 Three of the 
conventions listed above, the  OAS Convention, the OECD Convention, and the EU 
Convention concentrate solely on corruption of public officials though they vary in terms 
of scoping corrupt behaviour and defining public officials. 
While corruption is much talked about in relation to government employees 
corruption is found also in the private sector. Wherever an individual is in a position of  
power and has opportunities to exercise discretion, be it directly or indirectly, in the 
decision making process opportunities for engaging in corrupt behaviour present 
themselves. Framework B conventions focus on the abuse/misuse of power in the 
decision making process for obtaining an undue advantage and are broader in scope than 
those Framework A conventions that relate to the  public sector. Of course the types of 
 
39 See Carr, I ‘Corruption in Africa: Is the African Union Convention the Answer?’ forthcoming Journal of 
Business Law.
40 Art 1 defines corruption as “any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other behaviour in 
relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their 
duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and 
aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others”.  See ‘Framework B’ below for 
more on Art 3. 
41 The World Bank adopts this definition of corruption. See Ofusu-Amaah, W P , Soopramanien, R and 
Uprety, K Combating Corruption (1999) Washington DC: The World Bank.  
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misuse, and the kinds of undue advantage outlawed vary between the conventions as the 
following paragraphs show.  
1. Framework A
The OAS Convention is the earliest anti-corruption convention with the prime   objective 
of eradicating corruption in the performance of public functions and has the following 
features: 
• It creates corruption offences both in the context of mutual exchange between the 
offeror and the recipient and where there is no mutual exchange; 
• It includes corrupt activities of both public officials and foreign public officials; 
• It covers both passive bribery (solicitation and acceptance by a public official of a 
benefit in return for an act or omission) and active bribery  (offering or granting 
of a benefit to a public official in return for the doing or not doing of act); and  
• It creates a controversial offence of illicit enrichment. 
The first corruption offence created by this convention is that of bribery.  The solicitation 
or acceptance, or the offering or granting, directly or indirectly of any article of monetary 
value or other benefit in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his 
public functions by a governmental official or public official is made an offence.42 The 
advantage gained by the public official  can be for himself or another party and  is not 
restricted to money but can include other advantages, a gift or a favour such as  a holiday, 
a job, or  a training contract for a third party. The term ‘public official’, construed to 
include government employees  and those performing services in the name of the State, is 
sufficiently wide to include besides civil servants  those working in public undertakings 
such as state trading corporations, various state agencies, and the judiciary.  The OAS 
Convention has an extra-territorial dimension  and makes active bribery of a foreign 
public official an offence.43 Foreign public official is not defined as such but presumably 
the definition of a public official referred to above will be relevant. 
 
42 Arts VI(1)(a) & (b). According to Art I ‘public official’, ‘government official’ or ‘public servant’ refers 
to any official or employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been selected, appointed, 
or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of State or in the services of the State, at any level 
of its hierarchy. For further on this convention see Sutton R H ‘Controlling Corruption through Collective 
Means: Advocating the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption’ 1997 (20) Fordham International 
Law Journal 1427. 
43 Art VIII. Note that the OECD Convention deals with corruption of a foreign public official in 
international business transactions. 
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The OAS Convention, as stated earlier, addresses corrupt acts that do not involve 
a mutual exchange. Art VI includes acts or omissions by a public official for the purpose 
of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party. This will cover acts such as 
failure to record donations and their diversion for personal or third party use. Since gains 
derived from corrupt behaviour are likely to be concealed the Convention also makes the 
use and concealment of property derived through corrupt acts as outlined in the 
Convention an offence.44 
An interesting but questionable offence included in the OAS Convention is the 
offence of illicit enrichment. This is also found in a number of other conventions45 and 
has been a source of some debate. According to Art IX “each State Party that has not yet 
done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a 
significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably 
explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions. Among 
those States that have established illicit enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be 
considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this Convention”. This article has 
been the source of some contention since it seems to place the burden on the accused to 
show that he has obtained his assets in a lawful manner. 46 In some  jurisdictions this may 
be seen as a necessary provision where there is total disregard of the law. Regardless, it  
goes against the grain of the expectation of a fair trial and right against self-incrimination 
enshrined in the various human rights treaties.   
The next convention in chronological order which falls within Framework A is 
the  OECD Convention.47 Unlike the OAS Convention the OECD deals only with 
transnational bribery and makes criminal active bribery of a foreign public official in the 
 
44 Art VI(1)(d). 
45 AU Convention and UN Convention. 
46 See Gantz D A ‘Globalising Sanction Against Foreign Bribery The Emergence of an International Legal 
Consensus’ 1998 (18) North Western Journal of International Law and Business 457.  
47 This was preceded by an Anti- bribery Recommendation 1994. For further on this see Buchan, D & 
Graham, G ‘OECD Members Agree Action to Curb Bribery of Foreign Official’ Financial Times April 30, 
1994.  The OECD Convention is influenced by the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enacted in 1977 
(hereinafter “FCPA”),  when it became clear that multinationals such as Mobil and Lockheed were making 
payments to heads of states and senior civil servants for obtaining lucrative contracts. For further on this 
see Longobardi, L E ‘Reviewing the Situation: What is to be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act?’ 1987 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 431. In broad terms, the FCPA applies to persons 
(legal and natural) subject to US jurisdiction and makes payments intended to influence a foreign public 
official in the decision or decision making process an offence. There are also special provisions in respect 
of accounting procedures.  
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context of international business transaction. This restricted ambit is not surprising given 
its historical antecedents in the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977. The OECD 
Convention focuses on the  bribe giver and  makes active bribery an offence. A promise 
given directly or indirectly,  a pecuniary or other advantage  to a public official in order 
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the context of an international 
business transaction is an offence. There is no definition of international business 
transaction but its interpretation is likely to be guided by mercantile custom and 
international conventions48 and would  presumably   include transactions where parties to 
a business agreement are located in different jurisdictions.  
The next instrument that restricts itself to the corrupt acts of public officials is the 
EU Convention. 49, 50 This Convention addresses both active and passive corruption51 
(namely, bribe offering and bribe soliciting)  involving community and national officials. 
The meaning of national official is to be determined by reference to the definition of 
‘official’ or ‘public officer’ in the national law52 of the Member State whereas the 
meaning of the ‘community official’53 is to be established by reference to the staff 
 
48 International conventions relating to international sales such as the Vienna Convention on International 
Sales of Goods 1980 construe internationality in terms  of the seller and buyer’s place of  business. See Art 
I(1).  
49 There has been some reluctance among the Member States in respect of a EU wide criminal justice 
policy and this reluctance is understandable. For an interesting discussion on this aspect see Cloud, M 
‘Organized Crime, RICO and the European Union’ 2000 (27) Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 243. According to the TI corruption index  among the EU 25 Greece, Italy, the Czech Republic 
and Poland have performed poorly compared to the other EU Member States and do not show any signs of 
improvement.  
50 Text available OJ C 195, 1997, p2. See also Convention Drawn up on the Basis of the Article K3 of the 
Treaty of the European Union to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial 
Interests (OJ C 313 1996,  p2) and Protocol Drawn up on the Basis of Article K3 of the Treaty of the 
European Union to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities Financial Interests (OJ 
V 11 1998, p,5). The Convention on financial interests came into force on October 17, 2002. Note that Art 
20 of the EU Treaty lists the prevention and combating of corruption as one of the objectives of the creation 
of a European area of freedom, security and justice, The 1999 Tampere European Council identified 
corruption as a sector of particular relevance and the instruments that have resulted aim an approximating 
national legislation and the development of a general EU policy towards corruption. The European 
Parliament has also set its sight on corruption in developing countries and has recently published its 
‘Report on Aid Effectiveness and Corruption in Developing Counties’ (RR\365027EN.doc of 27.2.2006) 
and adopted a  European Parliament Resolution on Aid Effectiveness and Corruption in Developing 
Countries (2005/2141(INI)) on 6 April 2006. 
51 See Arts 2 & 3. 
52 Art 1(c). Of course the meaning of ‘public official’ is likely to vary amongst the Member States. See  
Measures to Prevent Corruption in the Member States of the European Union, Working Paper of the 
European Parliament JURI 101 EN, Luxembourg 03-1998.     
53 Art 1(b) 
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regulation of the European Communities and includes those seconded to the European 
Communities by the European States.  
All of the above conventions are restrictive in scope in that they all focus on  
bribery with the exception of the OAS Convention which seems to reach farther into the 
recesses of human behaviour that could be classified as corrupt.   
 
2. Framework B
The public sector in developing countries is often seen as the breeding ground for 
corruption. Since the public sector in these countries provides basic utilities with a huge 
consumer base many members of the public have experienced some level of bribery at 
the petty level. Some of the developing countries have therefore privatised54 or semi-
privatised the utilities sector hoping that this would curb corruption. Since the private 
sector is profit seeking inevitably the charges of these utilities, once privatised, are high 
and puts them out of the reach of the low income group. This in its own way breeds 
corruption at the petty level, for instance, on the part of those taking meter readings for 
the purposes of billing by entering a lower meter reading or tampering with the 
mechanical parts of the meter to show a lower consumption in return for a payment.  
 Private sector corruption however is not restricted to the petty level. It is 
commonplace for senior managers to engage in corrupt activities in various contexts, for 
instance, in procurement and compromising confidential and sensitive company 
information. To root out corruption it is essential that the private sector is also included in 
the regulatory framework.   
The earliest convention to include both the public and private sector is the COE 
Convention,  focusing on the abuse of power in return for an undue advantage regardless 
of the context in which it occurs. In also takes a comprehensive approach in construing 
the term ‘public official’.55 The convention dispels doubts about which services are or 
 
54 Note also that privatisation is one the conditions imposed by the World Bank when providing loans to 
finance projects in developing countries. See Carr, I ‘Corruption, the World Bank and Conditionalities’ 
(forthcoming). 
55 Art 1(a) defines ‘public official’ as “shall be understood by reference to the definition of ‘official’, 
‘public officer’, ‘mayor’,  ‘minister’ or ‘judge’ in the national law of the State in which the person in 
question performs that function and as applied in its criminal law.” 
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are not included  in the public sector by including specific provisions relating to active 
and passive bribery of domestic public officials,56 bribery of members of domestic public 
assemblies,57 foreign public assemblies,58 international parliamentary 
assemblies59officials of international organisations, and judges and officials of 
international courts.60 The COE Protocol extends the list to include bribery of domestic 
and foreign arbitrators, and domestic and foreign jurors.61. However it fails in its 
comprehensiveness when it comes to the creation of offences. Corruption is construed 
within a narrow band that includes acts of active and passive bribery  both at the domestic 
and international level62, and trade in influence over persons in the public sector such as 
domestic or foreign public officials, members of domestic and international 
parliamentary assemblies.  The judiciary  is separately addressed in Art 12.  An 
accounting offence is also created to address fraudulent practices such as the  creation or 
use of an invoice or other accounting document containing false or incomplete 
information, and unlawfully omitting to make a record of payment.63 
A more comprehensive approach is adopted by the next three conventions in the 
chronological list : SADC Protocol, AU Convention and the UN Convention. The first 
two are regional conventions and likely therefore to have a limited impact unlike the UN 
Convention which is a truly international convention.  
Turning our attention to the two African conventions, the SADC Protocol64 
provides a definition in its Article 1 and focuses on the abuse of power in return for 
undue advantage. The specific acts of corruption condoned are listed in Art 3 and include 
active and passive bribery be it by a public official or a person working in the private 
sector,  act or omission by a public official for illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or a 
third party, diversion by a public official of property, monies or securities of the State, 
 
56 See Arts 2 & 3. 
57 Art 4. 
58 Art 6. 
59 Art 20. 
60 Art 11. 
61 Arts 2 – 6.  
62 Arts 2-11. 
63 Art 14. 
64 The following countries are members of the SADC: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Most of these countries  figure as highly corrupt in the TI index. 
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individual or independent agency received by virtue of his position for his own benefit or 
that of a third party, the fraudulent use or concealment of property described from corrupt 
acts as listed in Art 3, and participation as principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, 
collaborator or accessory after the fact. The SADC  Protocol also has a transnational 
aspect and includes the bribery of a foreign public official in its list of offences.   
The AU Convention simply lists specific acts of corruption and related offences 
but in doing so is much wider in scope. It includes in its list passive and active bribery in 
the public and the private sector, the controversial provision on illicit enrichment, trading 
in influence, diversion of funds and concealment of funds resulting from acts of 
corruption. The classic example of corruption, bribery, is addressed in Art 4 and includes 
both the direct or indirect solicitation or acceptance by a public official65 or a person in 
the private sector of an undue advantage in exchange for an act or omission in the 
performance of his public function, or in breach of his duties.66 The AU Convention, like 
the OAS Convention, includes the controversial  offence of illicit enrichment where a 
public official or any other person cannot reasonably explain the possession of those 
assets.67 The points made in respect of the offence of illicit enrichment in the  OAS 
Convention equally apply here. Laundering or concealment of proceeds from corrupt 
activities is also made an offence.68 The AU Convention includes an interesting provision 
on the funding of political parties. It expects the Contracting States to proscribe the use of 
funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties and 
incorporate the principle of transparency in such funding.69 This is a welcome provision 
since it is common practice in many developing countries to channel the proceeds of 
crime through the funding of political parties.  
The AU Convention does not include bribery of a foreign public official within its 
list of corruption offences which is a surprise omission since a number of African 
businesses do engage  in international investment , South Africa being one example. 
 
65 Public official is defined in Art 1 as “any official or employee of the State or its agencies including those 
who have been selected, appointed or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or 
in the service of the State at any level of its hierarchy.” The definition is sufficiently  wide to encompass all 
sectors including the judiciary and prosecuting authorities. 
66 Arts 4(1)(a) – (e). 
67 Arts 4(1)(g) and 8. 
68 Arts 4  and 6. 
69 Art 10.  
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The UN Convention is the latest corruption related convention and it is expected 
to have a  noticeable and successful  international impact since it seems to have the 
support of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and policymakers from developing and developed countries. Indeed countries have 
made known their adherence  to the UN Convention when passing legislation to combat 
corruption.70 It is much wider in scope than the previous two conventions in the group of 
three considered in this section. It criminalizes bribery of national officials,71 foreign 
public officials,72 officials of public international organisations,73 bribery in the private 
sector,74 embezzlement of property both in the public and private sector,75 trading in 
influence,76 illicit enrichment,77 abuse of function,78and laundering and concealing the 
proceeds of corruption.79 In taking a comprehensive approach it also addresses  aspects 
that may hinder enforcement  and criminalises the use of physical force, threats or the 
offer of a bribe to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or 
production of evidence. Equally intimidation of officials in order to interfere with the 
exercise of their official duties in respect of the offences created by the Convention is 
made an offence.80 
B. Sanctions 
 
As with other international criminal conventions81 the approach towards sanctions is one 
of  minimal interference or no interference in some cases. The SADC Protocol, the AU 
Convention and the OAS Convention subscribe to the latter approach in remaining silent 
in respect of penalties   leaving it to the Contracting State to decide how to deal with 
offenders. It is indeed difficult to understand why the regional agreements have remained 
silent on this issue since members of regional organizations have normally come together 
 
70 See South African Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 No 12 of 2004.  
71 Art 15. 
72 Art 16. 
73 Ibid.
74 Art 21. 
75 Arts 17 and 22. 
76 Art 18. 
77 Art 20. 
78 Art 19. 
79 Arts 23 and 24. 
80 Art 25. 
81 E.g.  Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime 2003. 
20
to pursue common aims and may be expected to achieve these aims through the same 
means. The  reason for the silence may be to avoid the rather sensitive and emotive issue 
of sovereignty given that a number of countries in these  continents have troubling issues 
ranging from boundary disputes to political  and civil unrest. To intervene in criminal 
justice matters could be seen as an encroachment of matters that should be left to the 
Contracting State to decide in keeping with its policy on criminal justice. The other 
conventions take a minimalist approach. The EU Convention, the OECD Convention, and 
the COE Convention in general terms expects the sanctions to be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive and provides some indication of the range of  sanctions that could be used 
for punishing corrupt conduct. This includes  fines and loss of liberty.82 The UN 
Convention appears to sit somewhere in the middle though it can be said that it is perhaps  
more willing to cover other aspects of criminal justice since Art 41 for instance states that 
States may take “any  previous conviction in another State for the purpose of using such 
information in criminal proceedings relating to an offence established in accordance with 
[the UN] Convention.” While including a provision on sanctions it does not go as far as 
the European driven conventions in giving any indication of the forms the sanctions can 
take. In Art 30(1) it simply states that the gravity of the offence must be taken into 
account in determining the sanction but that loss of liberty is contemplated to be amongst 
the types of sanction is apparent from Art 30(5) which mentions early release and parole.  
 
C. Preventive Measures 
 
Prevention through the participation of citizens, those affected by corruption  and closing 
the current loopholes in existing law such as banking law that may be used to deposit the 
proceeds of corruption are important means of fighting corruption. The UN Convention 
once again is expansive in its approach to prevention of corruption and deals with bank 
secrecy, 83 prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime, 84 the creation of 
financial intelligence units, 85 participation of society, 86 improving accounting 
 
82 See Art 19 COE Convention, Art 3 OECD Convention, Art 5 EU Convention. 
83 Art 40. 
84 Art 52. 
85 Art 58. 
86 Art 13. 
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procedures and introducing codes of conduct. 87 The OAS Convention also specifically 
addresses the issue of preventive measures in Art V ranging from codes of conduct, a 
system for registering assets of public official to participation of civil society. A similar 
approach is to be found in the AU Convention88 and SADC Protocol.89 The OECD 
Convention is the least prescriptive and requires Contracting States to adopt measures in 
terms of better accounting practices, 90 while the EU Convention and the COE 
Convention do not contain any specific provisions on  preventive mechanisms. 
 
D. Mutual Assistance and  Co-operation 
 
All the conventions contain provisions on mutual assistance and international co-
operation in the investigation and obtaining of evidence. The UN Convention covers this 
area in an extensive manner and includes various provisions detailing co-operation 
between national authorities,91 and between national authorities and the private 
sector,92international co-operation,93 mutual legal assistance, 94 law enforcement co-
operation, 95 and extradition.96 The OAS Convention,97 the OECD Convention, the AU 
Convention,98 the COE Convention and the SADC Protocol99 contain provisions on 
mutual legal assistance and co-operation except they vary greatly in terms of detail. For 
instance, the OECD Convention provides for  mutual legal assistance and extradition,100 
while the COE Convention goes into greater depth  by providing for co-operation 
between national authorities, 101 mutual assistance, 102 extradition103 and outlining the 
 
87 Art 12. 
88 Arts 5, 12 and 17. 
89 Art 4. 
90 Art 8. 
91 Art 38.  
92 Art 39. 
93 Art 43. 
94 Art 46. 
95 Art 48. 
96 Art 44. 
97 See Arts XIII & XIV. 
98 See Arts 18 and 19. 
99 See Arts 9 and 10. 
100 Arts 9 and 10. 
101 Art 21. 
102 Art 26. 
103 Art 27. 
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general principles and measures for international co-operation,104 while the EU 
Convention contemplates mutual assistance between EU Member States.105 
E. Some Remarks on the Current State of Affairs 
 
The list of conventions  and the number of ratifications received by these conventions is 
impressive. Should this be heralded as a sign of success on the part of the international 
legislative community? Far from it. It exhibits a lack of concerted effort on the part 
regional and international institutions. The presence of this number of conventions is 
bound to leave states wondering which convention to ratify or alternatively which model 
to base their own legislation on. It is interesting to see that a number of states have 
become serial ‘ratifiers’. This may be indicative of their seriousness to tackle corruption 
and perhaps a desire to ensure that all forms of corrupt behaviour are addressed in their 
jurisdiction. And where the serial ‘ratifier’ is a developing country it may be motivated 
by socio-economic reasons – to attract foreign investors and to show to lending agencies 
like the World Bank and European Bank for Re-construction and Development that 
corruption is not tolerated. In practice,  ratification of a number of conventions creates 
ample room for uncertainties. To illustrate, if state S has ratified and implemented the 
OECD Convention, COE Convention and the UN Convention when it comes  to the 
interpretation of the term ‘foreign public official’ which of the  travaux preparatoires is 
the judiciary going to turn to for guidance?  
 The existence of the many conventions on the subject-matter of corruption is 
perhaps a result of historical and political accident. The OECD Convention was the result 
of pressure from the US which had passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 
expecting that other industrialized countries would follow suit.  Instead it found that it 
was alone in penalizing the activities of their businesses abroad which affected the 
international competitiveness of US businesses abroad. Equally, the OAS Convention 
was very much a product of the US policy making in the Americas. The regional 
conventions in  Africa emerged in response to the  need to contribute to the socio-
economic development of the region. And since there was no convention that applied in 
 
104 Art 25. 
105 Arts 8 and 9. 
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Europe the Council of Europe drafted the two conventions,  one civil and the other 
criminal, for ratification by their member states,   
The anti-corruption agenda has evolved slowly through initiatives from a number 
of institutions and it is now perceived on the international scene as an agenda worth 
pursuing vigorously. Even  developing countries are embracing regulation to curb 
corruption enthusiastically, judging from the number of ratifications for the various 
conventions.  Therefore it is now time to ask whether any good is being done by still 
having so many conventions in force. All that it does is promote uncertainty since they 
diverge in scope, substance and procedure. The time has come to have in place just one 
convention that is comprehensive, forward looking and includes extensive and 
meaningful extra-legal measures including corporate social responsibility for the 
prevention of corruption.  This move might be opposed on the ground that countries will 
not wish to yet again engage in the drafting, adoption and ratification of a new 
convention. That need  not be the case. There is a convention that possesses these 
qualities – the UN Convention on Corruption 2003. Perhaps it is time that countries 
simply ratify this Convention and denounce their ratifications to other conventions. 
Admittedly the UN Convention may have some  shortcomings – for instance ambiguities 
in respect of sanctions. These can be refined where desired and needed since the 
Convention does make room for proposing amendments five years after its entry into 
force according to Art 69. 
 
4. Enforcement and Informers  
 
The adoption of a convention and its ratification by a State only goes part of the way in 
countering corruption. For any regulation to be hailed a success it has to be adopted 
sufficiently seriously by the people so as to influence their behaviour when faced with 
choices as for instance where a person   is influenced by the knowledge of the illegality 
of receiving a bribe in declining an  offer of  a bribe to  speed up the process of obtaining 
a passport. However, given man’s proclivity towards exercising free will it is not always 
the case that regulation of itself will achieve the aim of controlling his behaviour. Hence 
enforcement plays an important role in making sense of regulation. Regulation in the 
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absence of enforcement is meaningless and  at best, is a political exercise that does not 
serve the citizens of a state well.  In ratifying  an international convention and 
implementing it through criminal legislation a Contracting State accepts responsibilities 
both to the international community and to its citizens – it is a public commitment to the 
legislation and to see that it is enforced. After all, the aim of criminalisation of certain 
types of behaviour through law is to protect society from  their detrimental effects, and  
in the case of corruption, it is to promote economic prosperity and to protect the weaker 
sections of societies from the debilitating effects of poverty, and to ensure fairness and 
integrity.  
Much of the corrupt activity is of a secretive nature and parties to a corrupt 
transaction are unlikely to conduct their affairs in the open for all to see. The enforcement 
of anti-corruption legislation is therefore dependant on sophisticated investigative 
techniques, both overt106 and covert. Periodic surveillance of  officials, undercover 
operations, use of banks to report unusually large transactions and their scrutiny may be 
ways of exposing corrupt behaviour. However such proactive techniques, if adopted, 
need to be balanced against  human rights obligations of the State, so that there is no 
infringement of the right to privacy, right against self-incrimination, and property related 
rights.107 Investigative techniques such as surveillance and  examination of bank accounts 
are  of limited use and are dependent upon an investigative and enforcement service with 
ample financial and personnel provision.  Police informers108 are cultivated, nurtured and  
widely used by police authorities globally and are perceived as a vital tool in the 
 
106 Overt technique is where the police respond to complaints of crime from victims. For more on the types 
of police work see Marx G T Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (1988) Berkeley: University of 
California Press; Ashworth A The Criminal Process (1994) Oxford: Clarendon Press.   
107 Ss 26(8) and 29(1) of the UK  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 allows the use of a human 
intelligence source under some circumstances. See also Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14; 
Halford v United Kingdom (1998) 24 EHRR 53; Teixra de Casro v Portugal (1999) 28 EHRR 101. For an 
interesting article on participating informers see Gillespie, A  ‘The Legal Use of Participating Informers’ 
2005 (5) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues.
108 According to a survey of police officers in respect of drug related offences  the use of police 
informants was seen as more cost-effective when compared with surveillance operations. Registered 
informants were regarded as a reliable tool for gathering intelligence on market structures. See May, T; 
Harocopos, A; Turnbull, PJ and Hough, M ‘Serving UP: The Impact of Low-level Police Enforcement on 
Drug Markets’ Police Research Series Paper 133  (2000) London: PRCC Unit Publications. 
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detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities,109 and more so in respect 
of hidden criminal activity such as corruption.110 
While the use of informers (also known as ‘informants’, ‘police sources’)111 is 
widespread there is limited research on their background and their motivations in 
imparting  information to the police. The available research112 in this largely ‘secretive’ 
policing activity suggests that most of the informers are in some way connected to the 
criminal fraternity directly or indirectly though there are the few who are not.   Their 
motivations vary. Some are tempted by the police reward whilst others may divulge 
information in return for immunity or for a reduction in sentence or for the purposes of 
protecting loved ones from getting involved with the criminal fraternity. Revenge is also 
cited as a reason for providing police with information. And there are those who are 
driven by moral principles and act for the greater good. In most cases there is some sort 
of exchange between the informer and the informed, be it of money, leniency in 
sentencing or some other favour.113 It is indeed very difficult to gauge the success of this 
mechanism in the context of corruption. Regardless of various mechanisms that the 
police may have in place in accessing information from ‘good’ sources the reliability of 
such information is debatable and may result in miscarriages of justice.114 
109 See Haglund, E ‘Impeaching the Underworld Informant’ 1990 (63) Southern California Law Review
1407; Oscapella, E ‘A Study of Informers in England’ 1980 The Criminal Law Review 136; Lawler L E 
‘Police Informer Privilege: A Study for the Law Reform Commission of Canada’ 1986 (28:2) The Criminal 
Law Quarterly 91; Maguire, M and John, T Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants; Integrated 
Approaches 1995 London: Home Office Research Group  
110 See Parker, R ‘Confidential Informants and  the Truth Finding Function’ 1986 (4) Cooley Law Review
565. 
111 I use the term ‘informers’ here to refer to ‘informants’ and ‘police sources’ and do not draw any 
distinctions thus following the general trend in research related to police informers. However, according to 
McCabe RJ  ‘informants’ refer to those who unwittingly or wittingly (for no reward) give information to 
the police, while ‘source’ is a generic term for anyone who gives information to the police, and ‘informers’ 
are those who for personal reward or personal motivation give information to the police and are in some 
way related to the criminal community.  McCabe RJ ‘Procedures to be Adopted for Management, Control 
and Evaluation of Sources of Information’  (1989) Unpublished Report as cited in Police Informants: A 
Discussion Paper on the Nature and Management of the Relationship between Police and their Informants 
(1993) Sydney: ICAC.  
112 See Rose, D In the Name of the Law (1996) London: Vantage Press; Greer, S Supergrasses: A Study in 
the Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland (1995) London: Clarendon Press. 
113 See Billingsley, R, Nemitz, T & Bean, P Informers (2001) Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing. 
114 See Martin D L ‘The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative Study’ in 
Westervelt S and Humphreys J (eds)  Wrongfully Convicted: When Justice Fails (2001) Piscataway, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
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Neither covert surveillance techniques nor the use of informers are viable 
techniques in the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation due to their high financial 
costs and the high risk of unreliability of information obtained. Financial costs will cause 
concern to developing countries that do not have sufficient revenue to invest in basic 
infrastructure for a number of reasons ranging from civil war to border conflicts and 
defence expenditure.  
A class of informant who may be able to provide better quality  information in 
terms of reliability  for enforcement purposes is the whistleblower – employees from 
within an organisation who expose malpractices within their organisations. Since 
whistleblowers are likely to face reprisals at their place of employment some of  the 
adopted anti-corruption conventions require that legislation protecting whistleblowers be 
passed in states ratifying the conventions.115 Jurisdictions such as the UK,116 South 
Africa,117 Australia, 118 and the US119 have whistleblower protection legislation. Since 
whistleblowers divulge malpractices within their organisations they have the potential to 
play an important role in curbing grand corruption – for instance, where their 
organisation is engaged in corrupt practices in tendering for overseas contracts.  
While the legislation may guarantee legal protection to a whistleblower, it is 
debatable whether this of itself will be sufficient to enable an individual to come forward 
to report questionable activities within an organisation.  There are no available 
comparative statistics relating to number of complaints about malpractices involving 
whistleblowers  to assess the success of the legislation.  However, what is overlooked are 
the likely psychological effects such as stress and the social aftermath of a disclosure on 
the individual who discloses.120 Society at large including his fellow employees and other 
employers in the sector  perceive such an act on the part of an individual as exhibiting 
disloyalty towards the employers and fellow employees, and the individual will have to 
bear the cross of disloyalty regardless of whatever legal protection that may be 
 
115 See for example Art 4(e) SADC Protocol, Art 5(5) AU Convention. 
116 Public Disclosures Act 1999. 
117 Public Disclosures Act 2000. 
118 Public Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW)  as amended 1998. 
119 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
120 See Westin A F, Kurtz, H I, Robbins, A  (eds) Whistle-blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation
(1981) New York; McGraw-Hill, Bucy P H ‘Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World’ 2002 
(39:4) Houston Law Review 944. 
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provided.121 This cross may prove to be too burdensome. The contribution that 
whistleblower legislation may make towards  enforcement of anti-corruption legislation 
is likely to be minimal unless social attitudes towards whistleblowers change. This could 
happen over time through what I call re-socialization122 of the general populace by 
imparting the importance of good practice in the conduct of business practice – be it in 
the public sector or private -  and promoting the need for striking a balance between 
acting for the greater good and self-seeking behaviour. 
Given the financial costs of surveillance and the limited usefulness of police 
informers are there any other legal means through which anti-corruption legislation could 
be enforced by members of the public? The answer may lie in  action qui tam123 or the 
common informer action abolished in Britain in 1951 with the Common Informers Act. 
The origins of common informers action is traceable to the end of the 13th century. It 
enabled individuals to initiate actions in the royal courts on their behalf and that of the 
Crown.124 By the 16th century qui tam actions were explicitly or implicitly included in 
statutes to overcome the difficulties in enforcing penal laws and  the common informer 
normally obtained a share of the fines that were to be received by the Crown. In an era 
where there was no police force this seemed an ideal method for minimising the gap 
between legislation and enforcement. The offer of a bounty preying on human greed 
brings in its wake its own dangers. Predictably,   many perceived informing as a lucrative 
career and there are records of individuals taking on this activity seriously.125 It seems 
that in the 16th century common informers played an important role in enforcing  
economic regulation ranging from customs and foreign trade offences to marketing and 
manufacturing offences.126 The usefulness of such informers however was short lived due 
to abuse of the system by common informers, for instance extracting money from the law 
 
121 Glazer, M ‘Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared’ 1983 (13) Hasting Ctr Rpt 33. 
122 See ‘Fighting Corruption through Re-Socialization’ below. 
123 Short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitir (“who 
pursues this action onour Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own”). See also Blackstone, W 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768) Book the Third, 160. 
124 See Prior of Lewes v De Holt (1931) 48 Selden Society  198. 
125 For an interesting article on George Whelplay who seems to have made a career as an informer in the 
16th century see Elton G R  ‘Informing for Profit: A Sidelight on Tudor Methods of Law-enforcement’ 
1954 (11:2) Cambridge Historical Journal 149. 
126 For an excellent account on the use of the penal statutes see Beresford, M W  ‘The Common Informer, 
the Penal Statutes and Economic Regulation’ 1957 (10:2) The Economic History Review 221. 
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breaker with threat of a court action thus attracting unflattering comments. According to 
Sir Edward Coke the informer “doth vex and pauperise the subject and the community of 
the poorer sort, for malice or private ends and never for love of justice”.127 Qui tam 
actions re-emerged in the 20th century as a force to reckon with in the context of the Lord 
Day’s Observance Act 1781 and the Sunday Observance Act 1677. The abuse associated 
with such actions however continued and in 1951 the common informers action was 
abolished. The debates in the House of Commons exhibit the level of contempt towards 
common informers. According to Sir Gerald Hurst the common informer is just a 
“complete sneak who engages in legalised blackmail” and illustrated legal blackmail 
thus:  
In August last all the stars of the theatrical and cinema world in the 
neighbourhood of Manchester intended to give a garden party for charity on a 
Sunday afternoon. A man who lived over 180 miles away gave notice to the 
police of infringement of the [Lord’s Day Observance] Act of 1781, and 
threatened to bring action for penalties. That is what I call legalised blackmail.128 
Independently of the attitudes towards common informers in Britain, the US in 
1863 enacted the False Claims Act (hereinafter “FCA”) to root out fraud  such as false 
records, and false claims for payment on the part of contractors against the Government. 
Since the aim of the FCA was to  encourage informers to come forward with information 
in return for a share of the fine in  respect of such fraud it empowered citizens129 to bring 
suit on behalf of the Government  for fraud against the Government. Qui tam suits were 
fairly common until amendments to the Act in 1943 following  a controversial decision in 
US ex rel. Marcus v Hess130, a case that held that the relator could bring a suit based on 
information already possessed by the Government. The 1943 amendments put an  end to 
‘parasitical suits’ by disallowing actions based on information already known to the 
Government. However, in the 1980s there was renewed interest on the part of the US 
Congress in the FCA due to growing concerns about fraud against the Government,131 
127 Institutes (Vol. III) as cited in Beresford, M W  ibid. fn 5. Coke’s texts are available at 
http://olldownload.liberty.fund.org .
128 Hansard House of Commons 1933-34 at 843; Hansard House of Commons 1950-1951 at 2079. 
129 Known as ‘relators’ since the action is brought on relation of the citizen. 
130 317 US 57 (1943) 
131 US Code Congress & Administration News, 1986, 5266. 
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especially relating to defence contracts. The FCA was amended in 1986 so as to allow a 
relator to bring a suit as long as he was the original source of the information and the 
financial rewards were also substantially increased. As a consequence of these 
amendments there has been a marked increase in qui tam actions and according to a  
report from the US Department of Justice in 2005 the Justice Department recovered $1.4 
billion in fraud and false claims. Of this figure $ 1.1 billion was recovered in association 
with qui tam actions.132 The FCA, seen as a “primary weapon to fight government fraud”, 
has been heralded by the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division of the US 
Department of Justice as giving “ordinary citizens the courage and protection to blow the 
whistle on government fraud”.133 
It seems from the US experience that qui tam action  has the potential to play an 
important role in fighting corruption. On the one hand we have the British distrust of 
common informers and strong doubts in respect of common informer actions in 
furthering justice  and, on the other we have their enthusiastic reception of the US law 
enforcement institutions. The US success story in recovering huge amounts in fraud and 
false claims is sufficiently persuasive for arguing for the introduction of qui tam actions 
in exposing corruption. Of course, there is the danger of spurious actions and legalised 
blackmail in the form of  threats of initiating action to elicit money from the law breaker, 
but it is  possible to insert suitable safeguards to reduce the number of spurious claims as 
in the FCA134 and to introduce stiff penalties for those abusing or misusing qui tam 
actions for malicious ends. No doubt it will add another layer of bureaucracy and extra 
pressures on the Attorney General and other relevant institutions within a country.  
While there is a lot to be said for the views expressed by the British Members of 
Parliament we have to be aware that circumstances are far different from those 
 
132 ‘Justice Department Recovers $1.4 Billion in Fraud & False Claims in Fiscal Year 2005; More than $ 15 
Billion since 1986’ November 7, 2005 available at http://www.usdoj.gov . Many of these actions revolved 
round false and fraudulent claims in the health sector.  
133 Ibid.
134 The filing of a claim under FCA is an extremely detailed procedure and the Attorney General must 
investigate the allegations diligently.  The FCA gives great powers to the Department of Justice to examine 
the merits of the qui tam action and it may move to dismiss the relator’s complaint, “either because there is 
no case, or the case conflicts with significant statutory or policy interests of the United States”.  See US ex 
rel. Sequoia Orange Co v Sunland Packing House Co 912 F. Supp 132 (D Cal 1995) and Kovacic W E 
‘Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring devices in Government Contracting’ 1996 (29) Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review 1799. 
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immediately  post World War II. We now live in a global community where the 
defensiveness of borders have eroded  by free trade and notions of  sovereignty and the 
idea of nation state has taken on new hues with the emergence of multinational 
corporations as powerful economic and political entities.  In their quest for increasing 
their market share and market power  corruption is simply a tool for furthering their 
ambitions and they remain oblivious to the ensuing poverty in developing countries and 
least developed countries. In these circumstances it is important to explore  what may be 
regarded as outdated actions to see whether these could provide useful tools to combat 
corruption. Allowing qui tam actions  in the corruption context is not a  revolution. It is 
simply resorting to private justice and this is not a novel idea. It can be traced back to 
thirteenth century Britain except that now this private justice will work in partnership 
with the judicial institutions of a state. The privatisation of justice is emerging in other 
areas too – for instance in the use of mediation in international commercial contracts.135 
Of course this resort to private-public partnership in matters of pursuing justice might not 
suit countries where judicial institutions are still in the making  or ineffective due to 
interference from the political structures.  
 
5. Fighting Corruption Through Re-socialization 
 
While anti-corruption regulation in the form of an international convention is to be 
welcomed it provides only a partial answer. Its biggest drawback is enforcement deficit. 
As stated in the preceding part use of police informers is not a concrete method of 
enforcing legislation since it carries with it a high element of risk. However sophisticated 
risk assessment and risk management methods may be as reflected by the codes of 
practice adopted by a law enforcement agency in their selection of informers, reliability 
will continue to be a problem. Qui tam action and the ensuing private-public partnership 
on the other hand may provide an interesting method to enhance enforcement of anti-
corruption legislation. It too has its pitfalls since it may attract bounty hunters who have 
lost sight of justice and the checks in place to stop spurious actions may not always be 
effective due to lack of personnel and other bureaucratic contingencies. 
 
135 For more on mediation see Carr, I ‘Mediation: Features, Associated Issues and  Harmonisation on the 
Horizon’ 2003 (2:3) Journal of International Commercial Law 11. 
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The difficulties associated with enforcement brings with it the spectre of 
hopelessness. There are, however, other means of making the populace realise the 
harmful effects of corruption on the general welfare of citizens, be it at a global or at a 
state level, and of the need to think of the greater good as opposed to engaging in self-
seeking behaviour such as corruption.  In re-socialisation, in making people aware of the 
long term effects of corruption on the human condition,  lies at least part of the answer. In 
a world riddled with illiteracy, prejudices and ignorance, the  re-socialisation process will 
take time and effort. So how do we go about highlighting the short and long term ill 
effects of corrupt behaviour on the part of the few on the greater whole and how do we 
build in mechanisms other than legislation to curb and prevent corruption? 
Educating people as to the detrimental effects of corruption and of their central 
role  in its prevention, I believe, holds part of  the key. In the absence of knowledge of the 
long term impact of corruption on the economic well being of a nation and its people  
there is the danger that corruption may be seen simply as a quick fix solution for a  
problem and a commonplace nuisance that a person has to put up with in obtaining a  
licence, a contract, a job  or a passport.  
There are no immediately  identifiable faces of victims of corruption. Since it is 
not possible to point to X and Y as those who have suffered as a consequence of a corrupt 
act,  it is difficult fully to appreciate the effects of corruption. The victim of corruption, 
however, is humanity, and humanity is the countless hungry and starving to be found 
across all continents. An appreciation of  corruption’s debilitating economic impact and 
consequently its role as  a breeding ground for local and global poverty must be made 
widely known to the general public. This in turn will enable citizens to foster a common 
goal and mobilise them to initiate steps necessary for eradicating a practice, a habit,  that 
runs counter to social justice, to promote the happiness and well-being of the greater 
number.  It is not a matter that should  be left to the rarefied atmosphere of academics and 
realm of the economists, policy makers, and legislators. There is no doubt that the bribing 
of a public official, for instance, in a developing country to obtain a licence for installing 
a chemical factory with lax health and safety standards may in the short term satisfy the 
immediate needs of the multinational in meeting its financial and annual targets, the 
expectations of the shareholders, and the living standards of the  public official in the 
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short term, and may also bring much needed employment in a poverty stricken area. But 
longer term consequences also need to be taken into account. How does the behaviour of 
the multinational affect other stakeholders: the employees, their families and others in the 
state?  How does it impact on competitors, forcing them to lower standards and cut 
corners? How does it relate to the goal of happiness of the greater number? It does not 
require much thought  to predict the long term impact of this course of action though it  
may not  immediately be all that obvious. Lax health and safety standards is a tragedy 
waiting to happen. The case of Union Carbide in  Bhopal,136 India provides a good 
illustration of the consequences of lax safety standards. It has caused long term human 
suffering spilling into future generations in the form of genetic disorders and poverty, 
since those affected are unable to provide for their families. The limited compensation 
agreed upon is yet to reach the suffering. Admittedly,  the above illustration of the 
widespread agony for current and future generations is an extreme one. But regardless of 
this,   the detrimental effects of what may be considered innocuous and harmless forms of 
corruption equally over time contributes to poverty and affects humanity. For instance, 
the  taking of bribes in order to tamper with electricity meters,  beneficial to the consumer 
and the bribe-taking official, causes economic harm to the provider  and other customers.  
This  may lower the ability of the country to meet energy demands required for attracting 
industries necessary for economic growth and prosperity.  
That education is an important aspect of preventing corruption is also recognised 
by the UN Convention in Art 8 titled “Participation of Society” which requires states to 
undertake public education programmes, including school and university curricula  that 
contribute to non-tolerance of corruption. The inclusion of corruption in the curricula will 
not of itself be sufficient to spread intolerance towards corrupt activities. Most 
developing countries have  low literacy rates amongst adults and much of the younger 
population do not go to school because their families cannot afford to send them to 
school.  In some countries children as young as five work in appalling conditions in the 
mining, carpet and construction industries. There is still a lot to be done in stopping the 
exploitation of child labour and education but a discussion of this is  beyond the scope of 
 
136 For further on this see Morehouse, W ‘Unfinished Business: Bhopal Ten Years After’ 
September/October 1999 The Ecologist 164;  Schroyer T (ed) A World that Works: Building Blocks for a 
Just and Sustainable Society (1997) New York: Bootstrap Press. 
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this article.137 Against this general backdrop the education of the public has to take place 
through other means and this will vary from country to country. Non-governmental 
organisations, civil society organisations,  and activists have an important role to play in 
spreading the ill effects of corruption, its impact on the community and society and how 
the citizens themselves can play a vital role in refusing to pay bribes, to inform relevant 
authorities of the incidents of bribe, and to co-operate with the media in exposing corrupt 
activities. Of course the above methods will have to be tailored to suit existing local 
conditions and local freedoms and this is where the local activists and NGOs have an 
important role to play. There are a number of successful activist movements in 
developing countries that have resulted in better forest management and irrigation 
management fuelled by social justice and environment concerns. The Chipko Andolan138 
(Hug a Tree Movement) and the Narmada Bachao Andolan139 (Save Narmada Valley 
Movement) in India provide illustrations of how social movements can contribute  to 
changes. For instance, the Chipko Andolan which started in the 1970s resulted in a fifteen 
year ban on green felling in the Himalayas.140 
The view put forward here is of the importance of instilling an awareness of the 
social impact and consequences of one’s behaviour not only in relation to oneself, the 
near and the dear but on whole communities, on humanity and on generations, current 
and future. Of course it could be said that this is simply an idealistic  viewpoint 
underpinned by a utilitarian and humanistic philosophy of society and social relations. 
Such a criticism would be unfair. What is being propounded is  not unrealistic, neither is 
it proposing an abstract and complex philosophical analysis of the moral and social 
dimensions of human behaviour for the philosophically initiated. 141 Instead the approach 
 
137 According to the International Labour organisation there are 246 million child labourers, For every 100 
children there are 16 child labourers and most of these are in developing countries. For more on issues 
relating to child labour visit http://www.ilo.org , http://www.endchildexploitation.org.uk .
138 ‘Andolan’ is a Hindi word for ‘movement’. 
139 It is a coalition of human rights activists, scientist, academic and people affected by the dam projects in 
the Narmada Valley. See also http://www.irn.org and http://www.naramda,org .
140 For further on the Chipko Andolan see Rangan, H Of Myths and Movements: Rewriting Chipko into 
Himalayan History (2002) New Delhi: OUP. 
141Traditionally, philosophers (e.g. see Quinton, A ‘Has Man an Essence?’ in Peters, RS Nature and 
Conduct (1975) London: Macmillan) have regarded  rationality demonstrated through linguistic behaviour 
(Descartes, R  A Discourse on Method (4th ed) (trs Cress D A) (1998) Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing)  as 
the distinguishing feature that separates mankind from the  rest of the animal kingdom and it is this that 
provides the foundations for morality, social values and justice. If rationality (See Bennett, J Rationality
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here is a pragmatic one. What is being argued for is making citizens aware of the 
consequences of their behaviour over the long term and their taking suitable steps to 
ensure that the measures they take towards achieving the goal of individual happiness do 
not cast a gloomy shadow on the happiness of the greater number. Illiteracy and lack of 
formal education should by no means hinder an understanding of acting in a manner 
while keeping in sight of the greater good since man has the ability to exercise self-
control. 
 Of course the importance of social awareness needs to be communicated in some 
way. This is where  civil society organisations have a central role to play. There is ample 
evidence that civil society organisations have been successful in spreading information 
and  harnessing a suitable response to the social ills of the global community. TI provides 
a good illustration of this. It has played a central role  in exposing the incidence of 
 
(1964) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul ) is that unique and only characteristic of mankind that commands 
respect (Kant, I Lectures on Ethics (Trs. Infield, L) (1930) London: Methuen ) and is the foundation of all 
human behaviour and choices it is indeed difficult to explain the high incidence of corruption that we 
witness globally. Even a simplistic rational analysis of corrupt behaviour highlights its harmful effects on 
society thus negating it as a rational course of action. In focusing on rationality as the distinguishing mark 
of man we have overlooked, as Mary Midgley in her excellent work Beast and Man ((1980) London: 
Methuen ) states, the biological basis that we share with the animal kingdom. As such, we have in common 
with animals certain innate tendencies, dispositions or passions to behave in a manner that may run counter 
to what rationality might dictate. If the  biological basis of mankind alongside rationality is consciously fed 
into our epistemic framework it is possible to explain and make sense of many instances of (irrational)  
human behaviour, corruption being one of them and to seek  appropriate steps  to overcome some of these 
natural tendencies. Of course in some cases corruption may be the best rational choice available, for 
instance bribery of a customs official to enable the importation of life saving drugs in a war torn country. 
While the justification may be morally acceptable and it may even be possible to make a distinction 
between self-seeking corruption and corruption for altruistic purposes, whether such cases of altruistic 
corruption should be legally acceptable is debatable.  Maybe it is something that could be taken into 
account when imposing penalties.  
Ethological studies of social behaviour amongst apes (For example, Goodall J The Innocent Killers 1975, 
London: Collins; Frans de Waal Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature (2005) London, 
New York: Granta Books) indicate the importance and protection of kin and group amongst the primates.  It 
comes as no surprise therefore that man in sharing these innate tendencies is well disposed towards those 
who are familiar such as members of his group, clan, race, culture and class  regardless of regulations that 
may discourage such behaviour in specific circumstances – for instance, anti-discrimination legislation in 
an employment context. Familiarity with members of his clan or group brings with it an element of security 
and trust vital  for  survival in the raw state in the Hobbesian sense. But humanity has progressed far 
beyond this state of nature to an era of globalisation with robust interchange of cultures, ideas and peoples.   
While sharing some innate tendencies with the rest of the animal kingdom, human beings are different in 
that they possess rationality that can be put to good use for exercising self-control and conquering the 
innate tendencies or passions that we all possess. As made apparent through linguistic behaviour, man is 
self-aware and also possesses a higher level order of self-awareness in that he is aware that he is self-aware. 
He also sees others as sharing these characteristics with him. As  such, he has the ability to reflect on his 
actions and consequences in a manner that enables him to choose, change and affect not only his course of 
action but also those of others and  is not tied  to what his innate tendencies might dictate. It is this rational 
aspect that needs to be cultivated carefully in order to combat corruption.    
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corruption and has contributed to harnessing the efforts of legislators and international 
institutions in combating corruption. More however needs to be done in enabling and 
involving citizens, especially in the developing countries, in playing a participatory role 
in not only moulding their own future but that of the global community. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Corruption is an endemic problem that affects the prosperity and well-being of nations. It 
is a major contributor to poverty. Lower corruption would see a lowering of poverty 
levels in the developing world since monies that would have normally found their way 
into the purses of officials would be available for building a sound social and economic 
infrastructure. International institutions and regional organisations have scrambled to 
introduce anti-corruption conventions with the result that there are now eight conventions 
varying in detail creating disharmony. The adoption and quick ratification of the 
conventions by a great number of  states are insufficient to curb the undesirable practice 
of corruption. Some countries have ratified more than one convention and this in itself is 
likely to prove cumbersome when it comes to interpreting the legislative instruments 
within those states. For instance, which of the  travaux  preparatoires should the 
judiciary refer to for purposes of clarification? What is needed urgently is a co-operative 
and concerted effort on the part of regional and international institutions to replace the 
existing regional conventions with a single comprehensive international instrument open 
for ratification by all states. Instead of trying to formulate yet another convention it might 
be well worth considering the UN Convention as that instrument. 
Regulation however comprehensive and widely ratified and implemented  is 
unlikely to prove highly successful since it is prone enforcement deficit. Corrupt 
behaviour by  its very nature is secretive and is likely to prove difficult to investigate.  I 
have  suggested that we need to adopt an approach that involves members of the public in 
the fight against corruption, through their refusal to willingly participate in corrupt 
activities. This is achievable through instilling social awareness, through an awareness of 
the harm that corruption causes  to the wider community and behaving in a suitably 
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responsible and balanced  manner with the happiness of the greater number and current 
and future generations in sight.  
 
